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HONORS CAPSTONE ABSTRACT

European soccer leagues are notorious for being competitively imbalanced, the same teams winning
the championship title each year. The question then becomes how this affects fans’ interest in attending
games. When fans can guess how a season will end before it even starts, why would they attend matches?
While plenty of prior research has explained the relationship between uncertainty of outcome and
attendance for individual matches, there is little research that explores this relationship in the long term.
This study uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure the distribution of championships over
a ten-year period for the leagues of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany and compares these
results against the aggregate attendance for each league in a given year. Controlling for market size, GDP
per capita, and country, statistically significant results demonstrate that competitive balance is indeed a
factor of demand, causing the demand for attendance to decrease as leagues become more competitively
imbalanced.
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Michael Yurkiv
11/19/2020
Econ 492: Research Methods in Economics
Examining the Effects of Competitive Balance on Attendance for European Soccer
Introduction:
The “big five” European soccer leagues are often dominated by one or two teams. In
Germany, Bayern Munich has won the last eight Bundesliga titles. In France, Paris St. Germain
has won six of the last seven Ligue 1 titles. In Italy, Juventus has won nine consecutive titles in
the Serie A. In Spain, the title seems to shift between two teams each year; since the year 2000,
Barcelona has claimed ten titles in La Liga, and Real Madrid has claimed six. Finally, while parity
is a bit more common in the English Premier League (EPL), Manchester United did win nine titles
between 1999 and 2013. Since then, Manchester City seems to have taken Manchester United’s
place, having won four titles since 2012.
The issue then becomes how fans will react to the same teams winning the league titles
almost every year. While soccer is unquestionably Europe’s most popular sport, one might
speculate that it might be even more successful if it were not for the same teams winning the title
every year. In the United States, it seems that the National Football League has a new Superbowl
champion almost every year. Despite having a much smaller market size, the NFL was still able
to earn roughly $15 billion during the 2018 season (Eckstein, 2019). On the other hand, all
professional European soccer leagues collectively earned roughly 28.9€ billion ($34.2 billion) in
annual revenue for the 2018-2019 season (Gough, 2020). Given a figure of this magnitude and the
potential implications for other sports, it is truly worth examining how championship title turnover
affects consumer behavior. In this research, I use data drawn from worldfootball.net to test whether
less frequent turnover causes lower aggregate attendance.
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Literature:
In 1956, University of Chicago economist Simon Rottenberg proposed his theory that there
is a direct relationship between how uncertain the outcome of a baseball game is and how many
fans will attend the game. Known today as the “Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis (UOH),” the
theory claims that “uncertainty of outcome is necessary if the consumer is to be willing to pay
admission to the game” (Rottenberg, 1956). Rottenberg believed that the “reserve clause,” a rule
in baseball which keeps players who are currently in a contract with a team from ending it and
traveling to the highest-bidding team, was an infringement on the freedom of the baseball market.
While some defended the reserve clause on the grounds that rich baseball teams would always
outbid poor ones and take all the talented players for themselves, Rottenberg demonstrated how
the clause actually has the side effect of keeping players’ salaries artificially low. He also asserted
that “no team can be successful unless its competitors also survive and prosper sufficiently so that
the differences in the quality of play among teams are not ‘too great”’ (Rottenberg, 1956). In other
words, success among two talented baseball teams is not zero-sum. Rather, when all teams are
relatively close to one another in terms of quality, fans are willing to pay more to see matches. If
all of the best players were on the same team, outcome uncertainty would be minimal, and
attendance would likely suffer. Therefore, Rottenberg believed that the reserve clause was not
necessary because teams would have the financial incentive to not put all of the most talented
players on the same team. While Rottenberg’s research was largely centered around the labor
market for professional baseball, his ideas about the importance of uncertainty of outcome are
largely applicable to any sport.
Building on Rottenberg’s theory that competition is what motivates fans to attend matches,
Neale (1964) argues that many peculiarities of the sports industry could be explained through what
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he refers to as the “Louis-Schmeling Paradox” and the “League Standing Effect.” Joe Louis and
Max Schmeling were considered among the best heavyweight boxers of the 1930’s. While the two
only faced each other twice (Louis lost the first and then won the second match), the fights are still
regarded as some of the most exciting sporting events of the 20th century. Neale makes the assertion
that, while monopolies seek to minimize competition and maximize profits, it is actually in the
best interest of sports teams to have “a contender, and the stronger the contender the larger the
profits from fighting him” because “competition is what arouses interest” (Neale, 1964). While
Max Schmeling was Joe Louis’s greatest rival, he was also his greatest blessing because “pure
monopoly is disaster: Joe Louis would have had no one to fight and therefore no income” (Neale,
1964). Like Rottenberg, Neale also believes that the Louis-Schmeling effect is the only reason that
the New York Yankees have any incentive to not sign all of the most talented players in the league
to their team, even if they could afford it. He emphasizes that when, in the late 1950’s, the Yankees
lost the division championship and brought hope for fans to see a World Series not dominated by
the Yankees, “they found themselves-anomalously-facing sporting disgrace and bigger crowds”
(Neale, 1964). Thus, just as Joe Louis could, at least in part, thank Max Schmeling for his success,
the New York Yankees’ could largely attribute their financial success in the 1960’s to their fall in
the late 1950’s.
While the Louis-Schmeling Paradox applies to individual matches with an uncertain
outcome, Neale also explains how league-wide outcome uncertainty could change consumers’
behavior. Naming this phenomenon the League Standing Effect, he articulates that “the closer the
standings, and within any range of standing the more frequently the standings change, the larger
will be the gate receipts” (Neale, 1964). Fans possess what Neale calls a “race utility,” a utility
that fans gain by watching games that are perceived to have some importance in the outcome of a
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season. When two teams that are near each other in standings play each other, it is likely that the
outcome of the game will not only be uncertain, but also will have significant implications for the
playoffs or even the championship.
Contemporary studies have made attempts to fit Rottenberg’s and Neale’s theories into
empirical models with mixed results. Humphreys and Zhou (2014) built a consumer choice model
that considers the importance of home win preference, the effectiveness of Neale’s League
Standing Effect, loss aversion, and the Louis-Schmeling Paradox on attendance for MLB baseball
games between 2006-2010. Loss aversion refers to the conception that “marginal utility of a loss
by the home team when the fan expected the home team to win may exceed the marginal utility of
a home win when the fan expected a loss” (Humphreys & Zhou, 2014). They found that “Day-today changes in the rank order standings are not associated with increases in attendance at MLB
games, and variation in the daily standard deviation in winning percentages in divisions is also not
associated with changes in attendance” (Humphreys & Zhou, 2014). Thus, the study found that
neither the League Standing Effect nor the Louis-Schmeling Paradox accurately describe the
behavior of MLB fans. Rather, loss aversion and home win preference better explained attendance.
Interestingly, Jespersen and Pedersen (2018) have concluded that fans of the Spanish La
Liga and Italian Serie A actually prefer matches with less outcome uncertainty. At the same time,
this study found that the brand reputation of the away side directly affects attendance. Thus, it
appears that there is an inverted bell curve relationship between quality of the away side and
attendance. Home fans naturally want to see their team win, so it makes sense that attendance for
games against rather inferior teams would be high. On the other hand, fans enjoy games against
other teams perceived to be of high quality, making attendance on the opposite end high as well.
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However, consistent with the UOH (Rottenberg, 1956) and the Louis-Schmeling Paradox
(Neale, 1964), Forrest and Simmons (2002) found that there is a causal relationship between
uncertainty of outcome and stadium attendance for EPL soccer matches, using betting odds of
matches that consider the bias of bookmakers. Forrest and Simmons also make an important
distinction between outcome uncertainty and competitive balance. Whereas competitive balance
implies “a league structure which has relatively equal playing strength between league members,”
outcome uncertainty considers “a situation where a given contest within a league structure has a
degree of unpredictability about the result and, by extension, that the competition as a whole does
not have a predetermined winner at the outset of the competition” (Forrest & Simmons, 2002).
While some research uses outcome uncertainty and competitive balance interchangeably, it is
important to remember this subtle difference.
Other studies have looked less at individual matches than at turnover, which measures how
often the winner of a league title or championship changes. In fact, one study emphasizes that this
method is more effective because “‘Turbulence’ at the top increases the interest of fans of a greater
number of teams. If, say, each team experiences diminishing returns to success in terms of fan
interest, then a league that is more balanced in this dynamic sense will be more successful”
(Buzzacchi, Szymanski, & Valletti, 2001). Buzzacchi, Szymanski, and Valletti refer to the
outcomes of individual matches as measures of static competitive balance, and the distribution of
league titles as measures of dynamic competitive balance. They argue that dynamic balance is
much more effective than static balance in increasing consumers’ willingness to pay for
tickets. Similarly, Schmidt and Berri (2001) calculated Gini coefficients to measure the disparity
of win percentages using panel data from the MLB between 1901-1999. They hypothesized that
long-term competitive imbalance should have a much stronger negative relationship with
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attendance than it does in the short term, asserting that “a fan would be more accepting of a team
that failed to compete in a given season if the fan knew that next season, the team would have a
chance to be competitive. If the slogan ‘wait until next year’ begins to lose meaning, fan attendance
should begin to decline more dramatically” (Schmidt & Berri, 2001). To contrast this measure of
short-term and long-term competitive imbalance, Schmidt and Berri (2001) computed one-year,
three-year average, and five-year average Gini coefficients. As expected, their results found
increasingly negative relationships between the Gini coefficients and attendance depending on the
length of time in question. Therefore, even though competitive imbalance has virtually no effect
on attendance for an individual season, over time, persistent imbalance causes fans to lose interest
in attending.
However, there is much debate as to how to properly measure the long-term outcome
uncertainty that relates to competitive balance. To accurately measure this dynamic competitive
balance, Buzzacchi, Szymanski, and Valletti (2001) designed an index G that measures the
frequency that a given a club entered the top k position over a range of time. This method is
designed specifically to account for the system of promotion and relegation in European soccer,
which alters which teams have a chance to even participate in the first-tier professional soccer
league each year. Another method of measuring competitive balance is to compare the standard
deviation of win ratios for each team in a league to a case in which wins are perfectly evenly
distributed (Fort & Quirk, 1995). This is almost identical to using Gini coefficients to measure the
supposed “inequality” of wins, applied by Schmidt and Berri (2001). Finally, Owen, Ryan, and
Weatherston (2007) measured competitive balance within Major League Baseball (MLB) by using
a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure the concentration of wins within a given year.
However, they make a point to mention that using HHI can lead to misleading measures of win

8

inequality, particularly “when there is a change in the number of teams in a league in which there
is a completely unequal distribution of wins” (Owen, Ryan, & Weatherston, 2007). As teams are
added to a league, the competitive balance will be artificially high. So, it is crucial to take this
effect into account when the number of teams change over a given period of time.
In summary, much of the relevant literature concerning measures of uncertainty of
outcome, competitive balance, and the effects these factors have on attendance come from theories
put forth by Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964). Rottenberg’s “Uncertainty of Outcome
Hypothesis” and Neale’s “Louis-Schmeling Paradox” and “League Standing Effect” inspired
many future empirical studies examining their validity. Some studies, such as Humphreys and
Zhou (2014) and Jespersen and Pedersen (2018) found that Rottenberg’s and Neale’s theories do
not accurately describe fans’ behavior. However, other studies, such as Forrest and Simmons
(2002) and Buzzacchi, Szymanski, and Valletti (2001) found that these theories were in fact
consistent with empirical findings. There has also been much debate as to how to accurately
measure uncertainty of outcome and competitive balance. While Forrest and Simmons (2002) used
betting odds set by bookmakers to measure uncertainty of outcome, this method does not work as
well in measuring long-term overall competitive balance. For the latter, Fort & Quirk (1995)
suggest using the standard deviation of win percentage. Schmidt and Berri (2001) recommended
using Gini coefficients to measure the disparity of wins. Moreover, Owen, Ryan, and Weatherston
(2007) suggest using HHI to measure the distribution of wins. Finally, Buzzacchi, Szymanski, and
Valletti (2001) created a special index G to reflect the changing nature of teams present in
European soccer.
Despite the wide variety of research conducted on how outcome uncertainty and
competitive balance affect attendance for various sports, there have been no empirical studies that
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use HHI to measure the concentration of championship titles for European soccer leagues and
estimate its effect on aggregate attendance for each league. While Owen, Ryan, and Weatherston
(2007) do propose the use of HHI, their method measures concentration of wins rather than
concentration of championship titles. I believe that measuring the concentration of championships
among various teams is a much more accurate measure of turnover than win percentage because
there are many teams in European soccer who consistently have high win percentages but rarely
win the title. Fans of these consistent runner-up teams must feel frustrated that their team can never
finish first. In addition, this method does not consider that ties are quite common in European
soccer, and teams who tie frequently would be ranked artificially low relative to their position in
standings at the end of the season. Therefore, I use HHI to explore the validity of Rottenberg’s and
Neale’s theories in the context of the four of the largest European soccer leagues (those of Great
Britain, France, Italy, and Germany). Controlling for GDP per capita, market size, and country, I
anticipate that there will be a direct causal relationship between frequency of championship
turnover within these seemingly “imbalanced” leagues and fans’ interest in attending.
Economic Theory:
The theoretical basis for my hypothesis rests on the idea that there is a relationship between
frequency of championship title turnover and aggregate attendance. This implies that fans prefer
competitively balanced leagues to imbalanced leagues. But, fans’ utility can also be shaped by
wins and other factors as well. This can be expressed through the utility function 𝑈 = 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑤, 𝑥),
where c represents competitive balance, w represents wins, and x stands for any other factor that
could affect utility. On any given matchday, the writers of the economics textbook The Economics
of Sports suggest that fans are most likely to attend when the home team has a 60% to 70% chance
of winning the game. However, this does not mean they want their team to lose 30% to 40% of the
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time. Ceteris paribus, the partial effect of w on U (or

𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑤

) is positive but increases at a decreasing

rate. This means that fans experience diminishing marginal utility of wins. In fact, according to
prospect theory, developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), fans treat the utility gained by wins
and the utility lost by losses differently. Known as loss aversion, this concept explains that fans
have a greater aversion to an individual loss than a desire for gain. Many studies, including that of
Humphreys & Zhou (2014) have concluded that fans prefer matches with less outcome uncertainty
because loss aversion causes the marginal utility gained by a win to be less than that lost after a
loss, as illustrated in Figure 1 below:
U(x)

Losses

Wins

Figure 1: Loss Aversion
However, while loss aversion explains why fans prefer individual matches with less
uncertainty, over longer periods of time, the overall success of a sports league depends on some
degree of outcome uncertainty because fans prefer different teams to be relatively near each other
in terms of quality. If this is so, then all teams should have roughly equal chances of winning the
championship, meaning the teams are competitively balanced. In other words, in the long run, w
and x are held constant, and the partial derivative of c with respect to U (or

𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑐

) is positive. To

illustrate why fans prefer competitive balance, Leads, Allmen, & Matheson (2018) cite the
example of the MLB during the age of Yankee dominance in the 1950’s. During this period,
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aggregate attendance numbers plummeted by 2 million within the American League (the league to
which the Yankees belong), and the National League (who had four different champions during
this period) saw an increase of 2 million. They posit that “no matter what objective individual
team owners have, consistently unbalanced competition alienates fans and is not in the best interest
of the league” (Leads, Allmen, & Matheson, 2018). In spite of a team’s desire to maximize wins
or profit, the most profitable outcome for any league as a whole is to have a relatively equal
distribution of championships among the teams. Of course, fans want to see their team win the
trophy. Nevertheless, as the league is increasingly regarded to be imbalanced, fans will likely be
less willing to pay admission to games. This suggests that competitive balance is a factor that can
shift demand for aggregate attendance for games. When there is a more equal distribution of
championships, the demand curve should shift to the right. The converse is also true. As leagues
become more competitively imbalanced (defined by an unequal distribution of championship
wins) aggregate attendance shifts to the left, as we observe in Figure 2. To observe this effect in
isolation, it is crucial to look at aggregate attendance for a league across an entire season rather
than looking at individual games because, as we have seen, for individual games, fans are more
likely to attend if the outcome is more certain.

Price

𝐷2

𝐷1

Aggregate Attendance
(Quantity of Tickets
Sold)

Figure 2: Increase in competitive imbalance shifts demand to left
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Data:
The data that I use for my empirical work consists of observational time-series data from
three major sources: worldfootball.net, www.transfermarkt.pk, and the OECD. The metric that I
use to measure how competitively balanced leagues are will be defined as HHI. As seen in the
literature, some economists have used HHI to measure the concentration of wins within a given
season of MLB baseball (Owen, Ryan, & Weatherston, 2007). However, Leads, Allmen, &
Matheson (2018) communicate how, even though HHI was originally developed to measure how
concentrated given industries were, sports economists can also use it to measure the concentration
of championships within a league. First, the number of championships (𝑐𝑖 ) that team i won during
a given period are counted. This is then divided by the number of years during the period T. Finally,
the fraction is squared. Each fraction represents each individual team’s share of championships.
Thus, the final step is to sum the fractions for every team:
𝐶

HHI=∑𝑖( 𝑇𝑖 )2
The resulting value will always be between 0 and 1, with the maximum indicating a perfectly
imbalanced concentration of championships. While it is possible to measure competitive balance
by calculating the dispersion of winning percentages within a given season as Owen, Ryan, and
Weatherston (2007) did, Leads, Allmen, and Matheson (2018) explain that using HHI provides a
much more accurate measure of the competitive balance of European soccer clubs because of the
nature of the system of promotion and relegation. In American closed leagues, teams who are
performing poorly near the end of the season have every incentive to use their remaining games to
invest in future seasons. They may use this time to give new players a chance to play or decide to
sell or trade their top players. In fact, since all American sports have a reverse-order draft, there is
even an incentive for teams who are near the bottom to keep losing so that they may have the
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highest draft pick for the following season. On the other hand, there is no such luxury for teams in
European open soccer leagues. In these leagues, teams who are near the bottom of the standings
are at risk of being relegated to the second-tier league, replaced by the best-performing teams of
that league. Hence, poor teams still have an incentive to win throughout the season. As a result,
win percentages in European soccer leagues are artificially high, seemingly more “balanced” than
American sports, where teams have no danger of being relegated. Thus, it is much more effective
to use HHI to calculate the concentration of championships than by looking at individual seasons
in order to measure competitive balance for the European soccer leagues.
As stated before, HHI will measure the distribution of championship wins within a given
league. This will be the explanatory variable for the scope of this research. Since theory suggests
that fans experience diminishing marginal utility with championship wins, each HHI calculation
will be designed to reflect the “long-run” period of ten years, meaning that T will always equal 10.
A relatively high value of HHI (0.5< 𝑥 < 1) demonstrates that the given league was competitively
imbalanced during that ten-year period. Due to the fact that HHI takes into consideration the results
of the past ten years, in order that it would match with the thirty data points for attendance, market
size, and GDP per capita, it was necessary to go back to the 1979-1980 season. Thus, for example,
the first observation for HHI is in the 1989-1990 season, reflecting the distribution of
championships since 1979. Data for HHI was collected from www.worldfootball.net, a useful
website containing results for nearly every major soccer league in the world for, in many cases,
the past fifty years. In total, I gathered 160 years’ worth of season results: 40 years and 40
championship title winners for each of the four leagues in question: the English Premier League,
the French Ligue 1, the German Bundesliga, and the Italian Serie A. Each observation of HHI
coincides with ten years of prior results, such that there are thirty observations per league, ranging
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from the first observation during the 1989-1990 season to the 2018-2019 season. Combining all
four leagues into the same regression, this yields 120 observations.
In addition to providing the crucial data regarding each league’s champion for each year
between 1979-2018, www.worldfootball.net contained much of the relevant data for the dependent
variable ATT. ATT is a measure of aggregate attendance for a particular year in a given league. It
simply sums together every team in a league’s total attendance for the year and scales the result to
be measured in thousands. With regard to the four leagues, www.worldfootball.net contained all
the relevant data except for one season in the French Ligue 1: 1995-1996. Luckily, I was able to
supply the data with www.transfermarkt.pk, the same source utilized by Jespersen and Pedersen
(2018) in their study.
The other two independent variables that I include in this study are MARK and CAP. MARK
is a measure of market size. Theoretically, a larger market size should equate to higher attendance
numbers for a given soccer team because demand shifts right when the number of buyers in a
market increases. In fact, one of the main reasons Rottenberg (1956) gives for the financial success
and dominance of the New York Yankees in the 1950’s was the fact that New York was the largest
market for baseball across the United States. High attendance numbers made the Yankees able to
afford many of the most talented players of the time, making it easier for them to win
championships. This allowed the cycle to repeat itself. For the purposes of this study, population
will be considered a proxy for MARK, since it is quite difficult to determine the exact number of
soccer fans a given European country has. Some fans may keep up with the results of their favorite
team but rarely, if ever, attend a game. On the other hand, people who attend games may not be
fans themselves, but rather guests. More importantly, population will be not at the metropolitan
level, but at the country level, since the relevant attendance figures reflect aggregate attendance
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for each country in a given year. Using data from the OECD, I was able to determine the population
of all four countries in question for each year during the period between 1989-2018.
Also from the OECD came the other control variable, CAP. CAP measures real GDP per
capita for the four relevant countries each year from 1989-2018. Real GDP per capita is simply
the GDP of a given country divided by its population, adjusted for inflation. GDP per capita is
used to estimate a given household’s disposable income, potentially to be used on soccer game
tickets. Since an increase in income could cause a rightward shift in the demand for attendance, it
is crucial to control for this factor as well.
The dummy variables (𝑈𝐾𝑐 , 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐 , and 𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑐 ) identify the countries of United
Kingdom, France, and Germany respectively, and they use Italy as a reference country (or
benchmark).

Finally,

the

interaction

variables

(𝑈𝐾. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 ,

𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 ,

and

𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 ) measure the marginal effect of each country’s HHI on ATT, again with
reference to Italy.

Table 1 provides a complete list of variable definitions

Empirical Model:
This research will utilize ordinary least squares regression analysis through Microsoft
Excel. The following econometric model will be used to analyze the relationship between
competitive balance (per each ten-year period) in the four European soccer leagues and aggregate
stadium attendance:
𝑨𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒄𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏 𝑯𝑯𝑰𝒊𝒄𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐 𝑴𝑨𝑹𝑲𝒊𝒄𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑 𝑪𝑨𝑷𝒊𝒄𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒 𝑼𝑲𝒄 + 𝜶𝟓 𝑭𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒄 +
𝜶𝟔 𝑮𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒚𝒄 + 𝜶𝟕 𝑼𝑲. 𝑯𝑯𝑰𝒊𝒄𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖 𝑭𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑯𝑯𝑰𝒊𝒄𝒕 +𝜶𝟗 𝑮𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒚. 𝑯𝑯𝑰𝒊𝒄𝒕 +𝝐𝒊𝒕
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I report results from three specifications of this regression model. The first does not include
any dummy variables (𝑈𝐾𝑐 , 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐 , and 𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑐 ) nor any of the interaction variables
(𝑈𝐾. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 , 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 , and 𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 ). The second specification will include the
dummy variables indicating countries, but not the interaction variables. The objective here will be
to compare the relationship between HHI and attendance for the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany relative to Italy, indicating any additional significant changes when controlling for
country. They will also serve to control for any specific aspects within each country that might
otherwise serve to skew the results in a particular direction. Finally, the third specification will
include both the dummy variables and the interaction variables.
Hypothesis:
Ceteris paribus, it is reasonable to assume that an increase in competitive imbalance,
measured by HHI will cause a decrease in ATT attendance. This signifies a leftward shift in the
demand for aggregate attendance as leagues become more competitively imbalanced.
Results:
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics, and Tables 3-5 report regression results
First Specification
The first specification of my regression was run without dummy variables or interaction
variables. As can be seen in Table 3, we obtain a rather imprecise result. The relatively low value
of R-squared in this specification (0.316) signifies that only 31.6% of the variation in attendance
can be explained by the independent variables in the first specification of the model. In addition,
the first specification does not yield many statistically significant results, since all but one of the
p-values are greater than 0.05. For HHI, the interest variable, we obtain a strongly positive

17

coefficient of 3167.938 but with a p-value of 0.142. Upon observing such a strong coefficient, one
might assume that my hypothesis could be rejected, since this would imply that more competitive
imbalance yields higher aggregate attendance. However, the p-value is greater than 0.05, which
means this result is not statistically significant. We observe a similar phenomenon for the control
variable MARK market size, which has a strong coefficient of 41.531 but a statistically insignificant
p-value of 0.068. With the control variable CAP, we obtain a much more precise result. CAP has
a coefficient of 0.121 and a p-value of 6.65×10-6. As we would expect, CAP (GDP per capita) has
a positive effect on ATT. Logically, a higher GDP per capita would yield higher attendance for
games because an increase in income is a factor that shifts demand to the right because of an
increase in consumption.
Second Specification
The second specification of my regression model was run with the dummy variables 𝑈𝐾𝑐 ,
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐 , and 𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑐 but without any interaction variables. As can be seen in Table 4,
controlling for country greatly improves the precision of my model. The R-squared value increased
from 0.316 to 0.864, meaning that 86.4% of the variation in attendance can be explained
collectively by the second specification’s independent variables. We also obtain statistically
significant results for all but two independent variables. Most importantly, the interest variable
HHI has a powerfully strong negative coefficient of -2046.64 and is statistically significant, with
a p-value of 0.047. This strongly supports my hypothesis that an increase in competitive imbalance
should cause a decrease in overall attendance.
However, even when controlling for country, we still obtain statistically insignificant
results for MARK, with a coefficient of -50.335 and a p-value of 0.451. This is rather surprising
because I expected that an increase in the number of buyers in a market (caused by the increase in
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population size) would shift demand to the right, causing higher aggregate attendance. On the other
hand, we do still obtain a strong positive coefficient of 0.157 with the statistically significant pvalue of 4.92 × 10-14 for CAP.
It is also interesting that two of the three coefficients for the dummy variables were
statistically significant. 𝑈𝐾𝑐 had a coefficient of 3411.073 and a p-value of 6.40 × 10-20. 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐
had a coefficient of -2061.36 and a p-value of 1.79×10-7. With 𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑐 , we obtain a coefficient
of 2775.891, but a statistically insignificant p-value of 0.073. This indicates that, after controlling
for the other factors in the model, I do not find a statistically significant difference between
Germany and Italy. The purpose of these dummy variables was to compare the relationship
between competitive imbalance and attendance for each country in the study relative to Italy. Even
more importantly, controlling for country helped account for any specific aspects within each
country that might affect the results. While the coefficient for Germany’s dummy variable is not
statistically significant, we can say that the statistically significant coefficients for 𝑈𝐾𝑐 and
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐 indicate that the first specification quite possibly could not account for some specific
aspect within either of these countries.
Third Specification
The third and final specification of my model was run with all dummy variables 𝑈𝐾𝑐 ,
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐 , and 𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑐 as well as all interaction variables 𝑈𝐾. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 , 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 , and
𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 . As Table 5 shows, the addition of the interaction variables makes for an even
more precise result, particularly for the interest variable. To begin, the R-squared value increased
to 0.892, meaning that, collectively, the independent variables in this final specification are able
to explain 89.2% of the variation in ATT (attendance). For the interest variable HHI, we obtain an
even stronger negative causal relationship between competitive imbalance and attendance,
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observing a coefficient of -9581.710. This had a much more statistically significant p-value of
2.05×10-7. This provides strong support for my hypothesis that more competitive imbalance causes
lower attendance. However, it is important to note that the introduction of interaction variables
makes the effect of HHI on ATT more complicated. The overall effect of HHI is calculated by
summing the coefficient of HHI and the three interaction coefficients, each multiplied by the mean
value of the country dummy variable (0.25). This yields a value of -2204.840.
Once again, we obtain a statistically insignificant result for MARK, with a coefficient of 42.276 and a p-value of 0.523. This is certainly not what one would expect, given that differences
in population ought to clearly yield differences in attendance numbers. For CAP, we obtain a
slightly stronger coefficient of 0.165 with a statistically significant p-value of 1.367 × 10-14. As
stated, this is as we would expect, since higher income should increase consumption of leisure
activities such as attending soccer games.
Interestingly, the dummy variable 𝑈𝐾𝑐 is no longer statistically significant in this
specification, having a coefficient of -811.612, but a relatively high p-value of 0.382. The inclusion
of interaction variables better explain the variation in ATT that was captured by the United
Kingdom in the second specification. The results for 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐 remain statistically significant, with
a coefficient of -5138.910 and a p-value of 1.401×10-9. Unfortunately, the results for 𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑐
remain statistically insignificant. Its coefficient was -347.659, and its p-value was quite high:
0.859.
With the interaction variables, we obtain very precise results, all of which are statistically
significant. For 𝑈𝐾. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 , the coefficient was 11985.55, and the p-value was 3.923×10-6. For
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 , we observe a coefficient of 9106.071 with a p-value of 0.000111. Finally, for
𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 , we see a coefficient of 8415.858 with a corresponding p-value of 0.000679.

20

The purpose of the interaction variables was to measure the marginal effect of each country’s level
of competitive balance on attendance, again with reference to Italy. From these results, we can
conclude that the United Kingdom had the greatest marginal effect on attendance relative to Italy,
followed by France, and finally, Germany. This is particularly interesting because, as stated in the
introduction, the English Premier League has a reputation of being the most competitively
balanced of Europe’s major soccer leagues. Whereas it seems that the same teams win every year
in countries such as Germany, France, or Italy, fans are treated to a bit more outcome uncertainty
in the United Kingdom.
Conclusion:
The goal of this research paper was to determine if there is a negative effect on aggregate
attendance numbers as the European soccer leagues from the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and
Germany become more competitively imbalanced. The statistically significant results from the
second and third specifications of my regression strongly support this hypothesis. There is a clear
negative effect of competitive imbalance on aggregate attendance. This phenomenon becomes
particularly visible in the third specification upon the inclusion of the interaction variables,
yielding a negative effect of -2204.840 for HHI, the interest variable measuring competitive
imbalance. Conversely, this means that more competitive balance yields higher attendance. This
result is quite consistent with economic theory begun by Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964), who
suggested that uncertainty of outcome and competitive balance positively affect attendance. In
addition, as expected, there is clear evidence that there is indeed a positive causal relationship
between GDP per capita and aggregate attendance, supporting the theory that an increase in income
increases demand. Surprisingly, there is less precise evidence of a relationship between market
size and attendance, since none of the three specifications yielded a statistically significant
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coefficient in either direction for this variable. It is clear, however, that the dummy variables and
the interaction variables were indispensable in producing the result. While the first specification
did not provide statistically significant results for the interest variable, the addition of the dummy
variables and, later, the interaction variables, made for a much more precise, and desired, result.
These findings are also consistent with those of Buzzacchi, Szymanski, & Valletti (2001)
and Schmidt and Berri (2001). These studies emphasized how “turbulence at the top” is what gives
teams (and fans) hope for each coming season. When that turbulence seems to subside as leagues
become more competitively imbalanced, fans are less motivated to attend matches. The crucial
difference between my study and prior studies is that prior research has mostly focused its attention
on how uncertainty of outcome affects attendance on any given individual match day. As seen in
the literature review, some studies, such as Humphreys and Zhou (2014) and Jespersen and
Pedersen (2018) have posited that fans prefer individual matches with less outcome uncertainty
because home fans have a greater aversion to losses than a desire for gain. Nevertheless, as
explained in the theory section, loss aversion no longer becomes a factor in the long run. My study
simulated the effect of the long run in fans’ minds by relating attendance for a given season to the
HHI calculation for the ten seasons prior to that season.
Thus, a key strength of my research is that each observation represents a degree of longterm uncertainty of outcome, approximated by the level of competitive balance in a league at a
given time. This is crucial because, uncertainty of outcome, at least in the short run, is truly
different from competitive balance, just as we discover in Forrest and Simmons (2002). Another
strength of my research is the high number of observations: 120. Typically, the minimum sample
size needed for a regression is 30 observations. The fact that I was able to obtain data going back
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40 years for my calculations of HHI and 30 years for attendance, market size, and GDP per capita
was instrumental in producing such a precise result as I obtained.
However, a weakness of my research was that I was not able to obtain all the data that I
desired. The original plan was to have five separate regressions, each with 40 observations. I was
going to have one regression for each country: the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, and
Spain. This would have made it much easier to compare how the effect of competitive imbalance
on attendance varies across the five countries. The problem was that attendance data for Spain only
went back to the 2003-2004 season, and I needed the results going back to 1989-1990. While it
would have made my research even stronger to be able to compare the effect across countries (and
a future study could still potentially do this with the four countries of interest), I was still able to
obtain statistically significant results that supported my hypothesis. In fact, even if I had been able
to gather the data needed for Spain, it is possible, even probable, that I would not have gotten a
statistically significant, much less as precise of a result as I did, given that each regression would
only have 1/3 of the number of observations that this study had.
In terms of policy implications, the results of my regression might dissuade team owners
from forming a team full of all-stars. In addition to the diminishing marginal product that each
player would bring to the field, it is clear that, at least in the long run, fans crave competitive
balance. No matter how much fans want to see their team win a championship, they experience
diminishing marginal utility after each title. One team dominating a league year after year will
make fans no longer willing to pay to attend matches. If owners truly want to maximize profit, it
is imperative that they take into consideration the preferences of their fan base.
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Table 1: Definitions of Analytical Variables
Variable
Aggregate Attendance (𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑡 )
(1989-2018)
Competitive Imbalance (𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 )
(1979-2018)

Market Size (𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝑖𝑐𝑡 )
(1989-2018)
GDP per Capita (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡 )
(1989-2018)
𝑈𝐾𝑐
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐
𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑐
𝑈𝐾. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡

Definition
The dependent variable, measured by each league’s
total attendance for a given season, beginning with
the 1989-1990 season and ending with the 2018-2019
season. Scaled to be measured in thousands.
The independent variable of interest. Each value of
HHI is a calculation of the distribution of
championships among teams within a given league
over 10-year intervals, beginning with the 1979-1989
season and ending with the 2018-2019 season. The
higher the value of HHI, the more imbalanced the
league during the interval.
A control variable that measures the population (in
millions) of a given country during each year of the
study.
A control variable that is calculated by dividing a
given country’s total GDP by its population in a
given year. Measured in dollars.
Dummy variable, uses Italy as a reference country to
identify the United Kingdom when value=1.
Otherwise 𝑈𝐾𝑐 = 0
Dummy variable, uses Italy as a reference country to
identify France when value=1
Otherwise 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐 = 0
Dummy variable, uses Italy as a reference country to
identify Germany when value=1
Otherwise 𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑐 = 0
Interaction variable, uses Italy as reference country to
measure marginal effect of UK’s HHI on ATT.
Interaction variable, uses Italy as reference country to
measure marginal effect of France’s HHI on ATT.
Interaction variable, uses Italy as reference country to
measure marginal effect of Germany’s HHI on ATT.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
ATT

9,786.192

Standard
Deviation
2,642.414

HHI

0.349

0.106

0.14

0.68

MARK

65.696

9.626

56.423

82.914

$30,772.644

$9,233.512

$16,141.211

$54,652.833

𝑈𝐾𝑐
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐
𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑐
𝑈𝐾. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡

0.25
0.25
0.25
0.0915

0.435
0.435
0.435
0.166

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
0.540

𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡

0.0757

0.143

0

0.512

𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡

0.096

0.175

0

0.680

CAP

Mean
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Min

Max

4,235.68

14552.75

Table 3: First Specification Regression Results
Variable

Variable Included?

Coefficients

P-values

Significant?

Intercept

Yes

2244.194

0.123

No

HHI

Yes

3167.938

0.142

No

MARK

Yes

41.531

0.068

No

CAP

Yes

0.121

6.65 × 10-6

Yes

𝑈𝐾𝑐
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐
𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑐
𝑈𝐾. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑅2
F-Stat
Prob>F-stat
Observations

No
No
No
No
No
No

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
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N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.316
17.991
0.0000
120

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Table 4: Second Specification Regression Results
Variable

Coefficients

P-values

Significant?

Intercept

Variable
Included?
Yes

7934.045

0.026

Yes

HHI

Yes

-2046.640

0.047

Yes

MARK

Yes

-50.3353

0.451

No

CAP
𝑈𝐾𝑐
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐
𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑐
𝑈𝐾. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑅2

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

0.157
3411.073
-2061.36
2775.891
N/A
N/A
N/A

4.92 × 10-14
6.40 × 10-20
1.79 × 10-7
0.073
N/A
N/A
N/A

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
N/A
N/A
N/A

0.864

F-Stat

119.729

Prob>F-stat
Observations

0.0000
120
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Table 5: Third Specification Regression Results
Variable

Coefficients

P-values

Significant?

Intercept

Variable
Included?
Yes

9816.572

0.00583

Yes

HHI

Yes

-9581.710

2.05 × 10-7

Yes

MARK

Yes

-42.276

0.523

No

CAP
𝑈𝐾𝑐

Yes
Yes

0.165
-811.612

1.367 × 10-14
0.382

Yes
No

𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐

Yes

-5138.910

1.401 × 10-9

Yes

𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑐

Yes

-347.659

0.859

No

𝑈𝐾. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡

Yes
Yes

11985.550
9106.071

3.923 × 10-6
0.000111

Yes
Yes

𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡

Yes

8415.858

0.000679

Yes

𝑅2
F-Stat
Prob>F-stat
Observations

0.892
100.741
0.0000
120
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